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1N THE SUPREME crnJR1', S'l'ATE OF UTAH
CRAIG M.

CHAMBERS,

CHArv\BERS anrl LINDA C.

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
SMI'l'HFIELD CITY and ROBER"'
RICHARDSON,
Defendant/Respondent

*
*
*

*

*

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT,
.SMI"'HFIBLD CITY
Sunreme Court No. 19252

*

NA'rURE OF 'T'l{E CASE
'T'\-iis is an action brnnqht hv Plaintif:f.s tn enjoin the
issuance of a huildinq permit hv Defendant, Smithfield Citv to
cn-d0fendant, Rohert Ricl-iardson.
DISPOSI'l'lON BY "'RIAL COURT
Hrtvinq fo11nd tl1<> case> to he proner for suJTlmar r
1

~udqment,

DISPOSITION SOUGHT ON APPEAL
n<>fenrlant/Resoondent SJTlitl-ifield Citv, and

Rohert Richardson

(hereinafter "SJTlithfield Citv" and "Richardson") request that
thP Trial Court's decision he affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Smithfielrl Citv accents the statement of Eacts as qiven hy
the Aopellants in thei t

hr ie1, hut ands Lil" fol_lnwinq summiHV and

additional fRcts to fie consiClererl lw the "01Jrt.
On !·la'' 27, 1CJ8?, Dursuant to the Reviser'! Orr1inances of
Smithfielc1 Ci tu, Utah, Ch.

4-'.> (r1) (Ii)

anrl after twice rleli-

berating anrl c1iscussinn the grant of a variRnce to co-Responrlent,
Robert Richarrlson,
aoprover1 a lot

53,

54

the Smithfield Citv Board of Adjustment

(area)

variance sought hu Richarrlson.

(record hereinafter c1enoterl as R.).

review oft'·"'
item IY.J itPrn

·1rionce ar:mlication,
3S

Record at

As part of the B1Jarr1' s

t•·1el"e finrlinqs were stuclier1

the·r relater> to the fact11al situation uncler con-

sic1eration anrl each item was voterl unon senaratelv before the
variance •·1as pass2cl.

(R.

building is coned RE-l

S7).

(reri11ir inq l. ;icre in area)

as '·1r. Ric!F1 •:cl son ow1ccd . <,7

RE-l

cOfl(O.

IR.

Because the site for

~c·

e,

the orocosecl

ancl inasmucli

th,o lot liavinq he,011 snli t

hv a

s~).

'.>-rl. Scecial questions.
(Ii) '"'hene11er 11n11.s11 l rircumst.once>s exist, tf1e Smithf c"l'l
Cit" r,011ncil ma'' rira.nt Vclr innr,r::~-; fnr bui lrlnci ournos0 ~
on an inclivirlual lot hasis or pi,oce of pronert••, even
thouql1 sairl huilrlinq ancl/or lot ma" not ho in c1Jnformance
with existing zoninq laws.
The Smithfielcl Citv Council
will consider s•ich exceotions onl'' •·1hen recrnnmennprl bv
hoth the Boarcl of Ac1'justments ancl the Planning C:1Jmmission.

-;>-

anprO'Jal hv the> Ro;url of Arljustmc>nt was ohtainerl, the

Cine<,
1

iancc> was rliscussPrl anrl approverl hv the Smithfield Planning &

'nninq Cnmmission anrl the Citv Council.
Jn~st

tlw

(R. S4,

'iO,

At

40).

one nf the Plaintiffs was present at the meetings where

variance, was discussc,rl.

:'nninq Commission, R.4S,

(Citv Co11ncil, R.40; Planning

47; Boarrl of Adjustmc,nts, R.'i7-,

From AoPellants' own complaint,

&

54).

it is evirlent that they not

nnlv attc,nrlerl the hearings on the variance, Proposal but also
receiverl notice of the same.

"In all cases the Plaintiff

nhiecterl to the variance uoon receiving notice of the ahove ment inn00 lv=:i.-:irin<l."

final grant of the variance precipitaterl a law suit by

~he
~

(R.?).

n0iqhhoring lanrl owners, Apnellants herein, attemotinq to enjoin

ll1n is,-;u;ince> of a h•1ilrlinq Permit anrl to rleclare> invalid the
nr o::r::i ii 11 t- es

11

nrlt? r

1\1

h irh

t11~

vri. r i ri.nr::~

0UES~TONS

l.

·~~?~~

was qr an terl.

PRESEN~ED

a rit'' ro11nsil retains R right t0

rP,1ie 1 ~

''soe~ial

<111-,'-:!:io,-," rlr>cisions rv1rlP hv a "loetrrl of ArljnstrnPnt, hrive the
/\iJlJr·ll-1.ntc:.;

rlu-,_-- ,1}

ri
?.

q

rici'lhhc)r_-irifl

h t_c~

11

n 10 r

~J

lnnrl0

1

·,n1 1-=:ir.c:;,

her::n rl~nierl certn.in proce-

ta 11 1 a. '·J?

Ts et iincirrl Gf

Arl~11st;nPnt

rictinq withiri its authoritv

,,,;-1<>;1 t•10 "lrietrcl opproves tl1c> qr-cin t of a 7'oninq variance allowinq
'' huilclinq nen1it to iss11'= on a .C:,7 acre lot iri an area
rGstrirte~

to

on~

~ere

lots?

-3-

1\RGflMEN'r
I.
'T'TJE REVIEW PR()('>:flTJRF;S PRESCRIRJ-:n 1N '!'HE CHALLENGED
0RDil'1\l'l\:E ARE !H'"Jlill 'T'HF, comwrr~' s LEGISLA'T'IVE POW<.:RS Arm
DO NO"' DTMINSH RlJ'r ~"'HER I'lCREASE '!'HE PROCEDURAL RIGWT'S
GRAN'T'ED '!'HT:: 1\ PPELT,AN"' UNDER U'T'l\ll LAW.
1t is Ancellants' contention that the review crovisions of
the Srnithfielr1 Citv Otninancc, somehow harms the Appellants hv
violatinq a rrocenural riqht.

1t is niff icult to unrlerstand

wherein the Accellants have heen harmerl inasmuch as the

challenqe~

orrlinancc, actuallv grants the Acnellants qreater procerlural
safequarrls.

P,ccorrling tG Anoellants, •vhen the Boarrl of An:iustrnent

Neverthelrss, the Orrlinance requires the
approval of hoth the Planninq & Zoninq Commission anrl the
Smithfielrl Citv Council hefor•' s11cfi a variance, is qranterl.
Ancellants' cosition is incnmnatihle with itself; thev

Countv Bnar0 of Anjucotment was firml·1 est<,hlishc;n in
v. Cache Countv, r;:u; P.20 440

(Ut0h l_QR1).

-4-

~hurston

'!'fie situation there

i~

rlirPctlv analoqous to a municipal council and its respective

Gnilrrl of Arljustment.

In Thurston at .141), the r:o11rt .stated:

is there anv requirement that, in making such
the r:o1mtv r:ommission must
s1irrender all control or Dower of revie•v; the Board
of Arl1ustm,c>nts is constituterl hv st;it11te il forum for
review of nll administriltive zoning decisions, hut
nn1·1hRre is it marlR the> exclusive reposi torv of annellatR Dowers. Should the r:ountv Commission elect not
to hestow upon thE> Roarrl of Ad1ustmRnts the power to
issue spE>cial exceptions hut to Plnce s11ch power in
thR Planning Commission instead, and to rRserve to
itself final Sa'' in thR dispensation of such exceptions,
we cannot sav that it has sought to clothe itself with
iluthoritv not granted bv the Legislature.
~0ither

n c1eleqation of authoritv,

~ooellants

ilttempt to distinquish Thurston hv pointing out

t 11;it "''iurston dealt •vith a C:ountv Commi.ssirm's review of a conditional use Permit.

ADPellants overlook the filct that the

issue in Thurston was orocedural in nature and that the orinciol" of la1·1 co:n,oundRrl bv t'1e Court is oirectl'' on ooint in this

Desoite Anoell;int's assertion that n orohihition of variance
r~vi·?".7

1

J\'

:=:,i_,°li_ 21-1:;"',.

2 C'i'=\' Cnuncil i:;

(7\n~~ll~nt's

11

irrtnlicit: i.n t11e

~,-i~f,

n~q~

17)

entir~

frarnewor~

Aoo,c>llants rearl far

as n r:it,1 Boilrd of Arljustment is ilooointerl by the City Co1incil
(fl.C.A. !lHJ-9-7), the Thurston Cnurt, at 446, staterl:
Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Enahlinq Act,
moreover, imooses a cur io11s a<'lministrative oarodox
on countv zoning systems 1~i thin the state.
-5-

of

RV law, the cnuntv comrnissinn is the borlv which
ini tiallv fnrnes the, o;:nninCJ res0l11tinn, unnn recommenrlation frnm the planninq cornmlssinn.
lt is
the t, ,sk nf the cn1rnt'' commissinn tn rlecirle which
uses will be oermitterl in which znninq rlistricts,
irnrl urmn whcit', if anv, conrliti0ns. Plaintiffs'
intPrpretation woulrl rrocp1ire the Conntv Cnmmissinn
to ociss all arlministrative cnntrnl over thP imnlementation of sn mucl: nf n nlcin as relates to soecial
exceoti•Jns, conrJiLional 11sps, anrl the lii<e, to a
suhorrlinatc> fJorlv, which ceases to he answprahle to
thP commission itself.
NntwithstanrJing the tact
that the countv c0mmissinn wo11lrJ retilin whi"ltever
contr<)l it rlesirerl nver t 11r:e iss11i"lnCP of reqnli"lr
builrlinq ne>rmits, i'· «1ni1lr1 be rlPrn:iv<>rl of i"lnv suoervisor,- DO'·.ier over t 11r::- issuanc~ of an'' 11 specia.l excentinns".
Assnminq, aro11<>nrlo, thi"lt such "special
exce>ntion.s", are conrJitionill 11sp nermits, we ci"lnnot
i"lqre>e thcit siJch an nr'oitrarv senaration of power was
within the cnntemnlation of thP leoislnture.
0

Leqislat11re to hci"e nrovirlf'rl for i"l Cit'' Bonrcl of Adjustment,

Council itsr>lf.

'T'l,urston,

"i"l

s•1ora. l

,-.,,_
i".i,n.,; all0<iPrl r1efer::ti,1e nntlcA nrnc::erl11re is excus~n or
curen hv 0ci:11,1l 110tic~ rPcei, 7i=:,-l nr n~rtir:iD~tinn hv Ano~llants

at the hecirinos.

thev werr:e inj11rerl hv all,cqPrJl·1 i'1cir1err1JntC' provisi0n.s for notic:e

1 It is also arqu"r1 that the' rr ,,ie1.,, nroc1"r11Jre>s of the> <;mi ichfielrl
Citv orainancf' qo he"0nr1 tl1f' enahl i nCJ stnt11tf' makinq All acti0ns
taken thereunrlro~ voirl.
Were this thf' case, th0 rnorf' appropriate
juclicinl resnon.se "loulrl be to Sf'"er the offenr1in11 lcinq11aqr' 0f tlw
ordinance rather than rle>clcire th• entirP orrlincince anrl all
actions tai<en bv thP Roi"lu1 •10irl.
Suc:'i il s0,1eri"lnc:e is nro·1irlerl
for bu orrlinance>.
Srnithfi 0 lrl Citv, Utah, Orrlinances, Ch. 10-4.
0

-fi-

(R.?).

in the Smithfield Ordinance.
In Thurston, sunra,

at 447,

1·nntnntinn asirle as

''h~rml~ss

round to have

(Annellants' Brief at 18)

the Utilh Court hrusher:l a similar

error''

e~ren

if s11ch a

~efect

were

"'1-ie Crnirt said:

e~ister:l.

It is conceder1 hv all n;ntie.s tl-iat hoth plaintiffs
were nresent at the hearinos which dealt with the
matters here under conside~ation.
As such, thev
were afforded an adequate onnortunitv to hear and
disnutP th" reilson>' 1J'1derlvinq the count'' action.
Commonlv, the presence of iln ohjectinq nartv at the
hearing c11r10s most dl"fici10ncies in notice requirements
relatinq thereto.
In surn1;1;ic.1, Anciellants'

arguments with reqarns to nrocedural

infirrnities noint to alleq10d defects which m;iv or mav not exist,

have sufferer1 due to
fact,

Aonellants

than those friund

1 I.

'Vi-if: no;,··-U)
,=~!\-=-',"!_,,

,~;]~

,:-i u •_ 11 n r

i

~

7~c:;

l_

'T\P,T

ha~"

he~efited

In

From oreater procednral rights

iri otl1er rn11'1icinciliti<0s 1·1itho11t an ordinance

C)iC

'"'"',:"

)',[),1\l.~'Di\":'l'T'

'·1 : )

11-_ ·l r'"

;illeged defects or infirmities.

SIJ(:l1

('1)-~}-~·-,-

~

!--1

()

-:r~

l{T,;)

Rir:H..u,.ru1so~1.

:'""" nrl •~

n'

t.

A!J'l'l-{ORI'T'Y '!'0 GRAN'!' Al'!

'T'l{C:

·1~.,;-_,,i,1--: 1 ,

1:1'-, ·_ ·rl'~ 'l

t

s1·1-CJ-l 'l

.\!IT)•

tri o·-Ant

.

l

SD0<:1A--'-

(l q 'i 3)
~xc~Dtions

Without the r<0lief
providRd hv a ''ciri;irice procedurR, sorne courts l1cive indicateil
that th" confiscC1torv cind in<0q11itcihlR nature inherent in a
zoning svstem might not withstC!nil constitutional scrutinv.
-7-

In Freeman v. Boarrl of Arliustments of Citv of Great Falls,

importanr,e of n. uarianr0

14

u.11tl,r)rit_v:

It is therefore anD?Jr"nt thcit tlv nrovision for ci
board of adjustment (or similcir fact-finrlinn horlv)
vested with hro2rl ncncrcil Dowers, is imnortcint to the
validitv o( the zoninn ordinance 2nrl the stcitute under
which it was enacterl.
Jn the cihsence of such a board
V'?Sted ,.,1i th power to nr~·;ent tti1=; in~q11al i ti~s an<i iniustices 1-1hich T"•.inhi_ r·then'ise res1ilt from a strict
enforcement of tl.eo 7'.Jr,inu nr.~inr,nc2, there would be
grave doubts as to thP cons ti t1itionali tv of tr1e
orrlinance and the stal:1ite unr1pr 1-1hich it was enacted.
0

As a creature of st0tnte,

th'? 001·1Prs o:f a Citv Boarrl of

Adjustment are onlv so broad or so narrow as dictated bv the
A reaainq of
the foregoinq stat11l:e reveals thc;t tl1e L'?qislature has qiven a

the Board t0 specific objec1:i·,1e r0s;:1
fallen to the

r,011rtc;

to

mnr.~

f=

ictinn~.

11.

:·'cil tnr: 5.s
the nrRsent c;;sp.

It has tl-iereforP

PCJ'.

i lv distirin11ishprl from

(R,8l\

the Salt Lcike City Board of Adjustments nermitting t'1P erRctinn
of a gasolinP SRrvice station in a rRsirlential area

-8-

(n prohihite~

:1~~0

in tl-)ot narticnlar zone), was an irnoroner exercise of the

TjOArrl's f)Ower.
holcl therefore that the Boarrl of Arl-justment has
no oower to f)ermit or authorize the use of orooertv
for, or the erection or construction of a huilclinq
clesiqnecl to he usecl for, anv nuroose or use not oermittecl within s11ch clistrict l)y the terrns----;::JI the 7.oninq
Orrlinance of Salt Lake Citv; ...
\·JA

(Bmohasis adrlerl)
The entire ooinion of the Court is reolete with references to a
change in use whereas the oresent case involves a variance in
area

onlv.

Therefore, Walton clearlv rliverqes from the oresent

case and other cases involvinq areci variances.
The variance requested hv Richardson does not contemolate a
change of use hut merelv ci reduction in cirea or lot
the RE-1 or one-acre resirlential estcite zone.
cipolication for
'

1

R

si~e

from

Richardson's

8uilr1inq oermit for "home occuoation" ancl a

sinqle fafl"lilu rlwPllinri" ns

~art

of

A.

11

resirlentinl estate

neiqhhorhoor1" nr<' ner111i :t:erl aw1 i:-1t:enrle'1 useoc; unr1er this zoniriq
1

classif:ication.

(R..~'l).

This
Clistiriction ivacc ?.rtir:ulC1tec1 in 1'\l1mni Control BoaI:r1 "· Citv of

A use variance is orie which r>ermits a use other than
that nrescriherl bv the zoning orrlinance in ?. particular
rlistrict.
An area variance has no relationship to a
chanqR of use.
lt is orimarilv a qrant to erect, alter
or 11sr' a stt·ur:t11re for a r>erillittiorl 11sA in a manner
othAr than that orescriherl l)y the restrictions of the
zoriinq nrrlinancc,.

variance is tCial courts ha·•e l10ld areil variancPs should he
considered in coniuction with the less demandinq "cractical
diffic11lties" stannarc1 fotncl ill many state statutes.
of Bronxville"· Francis,
.'\ff'D 1 N.Y.?n 8'39,

1 Apn.Div.'.Jn ?Vi,

ll'i N.C:.'.'n 7?4

(lCJ'i6),

In Villaqe

l'in N.Y.S.2rl 906;

a variance from the

local zoning orninance was oralltPn "so as to nermit trie
construction of a hank: h11ildilln r:ontilininq fl0or area in evress
of trie amount cermi tter1 hv t'lc:e ordin;rncc:e."

"'hc:e Court went on to

sav at qrJ9:
T.\Jhen th~ vari~nr:~ is onP of or;::;,'1 nnlu, th~re is nn
Change in thA cl)ara< . er oF t'JP ~011C nistrict and the
consinerati0ns n•c:esent in the Otto r:ase are nnt nresent.
A chanrie of area ma" '>e qrantP--l on tric:e qround of cractical difficulties al0lle, •«itho•1t consine.-inq whethc:er
or not tl1c:erc:e is all •1WF'cc:essar•1 harnsCiin.
Wite omitten)
'!'his co1Jrt is committPd to tri" nile that, ill the nhsence
of statutorv orovisir,,1 to tI1e contrarv, snecial '1arrlships need not he estahlishecl as a condition to grantinq
an areA vari~nce.
'Tl-iis crise was dis~uS.""

Secti0n 18.47
Tl-1e f':our::

(lO!;R):
~i~:;t:i.-·--:

1is 110'-1

which if1 17 ()]_•.rr:
r~·1, cnt.
siinil;::ir ,-co.qulati011'::: .-::r.rl

s11.:::~1_-l)l·1

l1r'1:·\1r~(-:n

,-,,,-ea '73.rianccs,

1__~'~ '.:.~·~r;:.r,._~, ?-.:Jc:;itir, nr
'J'.=',~ 1 1,~r"'..:'.J:nc.~-s, 1 \ 1 hir:l1 nermit: ;::i,
USP Droscri~1erl hv T- 110 ,~,,- -j n_r,nr:P.
I~ 1v)t: nnJ v fourirl t'1at
11
practical rlif~ic11lti0s" n.nr~ 11 1Jnripr,p~:;c:ar'l h,-.r'1ships 11 1·1ere
1

Jc:,cl-:,

rlistinct standarr1s, f-iut tlv;t Racl1 IV"\S intRnr1e 1 to liniit
the Roarrl' s 001-·t?r to cira.nt ,-, nar1:ir:11lnr l<inO of variance.
'T'he Court helrl th:'lt t'1<0 .Stein'1ilhPr req11irF>mRnt of unnecessRrv hardship limit 0 rl the cownr of R Boarcl of ~oninq
Anneals t0 grant u~n ~1ar inncr:.s, iJ11t ti-int area variances
couln be cirantPd 1m0n R showi'lq tl1at a li ter;,l RPnlic;,tion
of the coni'lq req11Lotinns h'0•1ld re>s11lt in pr;,cticRl difficulties.
(Emphasis AdrJc:ed)
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This concept was reaffirmed in Anderson v. Board of Appeals,
Ano.

'.l? M.D.

?8,

322 A.

7-d

·no,

':l::>f'.\

(lq74)

wherein the Marvland

Court of Anpeals stated:
IJse variances are customarilv concerned with "hardship"
cases, here the land cannot vield a reasonahle return
if used onlv in accordance with the use restriction of
the ordinance and a variance must be permitted to avoid
confiscatory operation of the ordinance, while area
variances are customarilv concerned with "practical
difficultv".
Following the decision in

\~alton

in lq3q,

the Utah

Leqislature modified the standard or test to be used in the
orantinq of a variance.

In iq4q, the Tltah Leqislature added the

Practical "difficult"" tPst to the "hardship" standaro bv the
adilition of paraqraoh

(3) (a)

to U.C.A.

§10-9-12.?.

(1'153)

The

amenilment imolies that the Leqislature intendeo a different test
be aoplied. 3

2

This trena has been followed b" other courts.

In

U.C.A.

§llJ-0-17(3) (a)
Before anv vari2nce
that:

m2'1 'le autl1ori~er1,
it s'iall rie
s'imm
(2) th~ varian~e ~!ill ~nt s·1l1st~ntiallv aff~ct t11~ comorehensivP
Plan of zonina in the cltv and tha~ adherance to the strict
letter of the ordinanc~ will cause difticulties and 'iardships,
the imoosition of which uonn the oetitioner is unnecessarv in
order to carry out the qeneral ouroose of the plan.
(Emphasis adoed).

(3) ( ••• )

3
Se>e ,1ournal of TJeC]al Studies, BriC]ham Youn(] TJniversitv,
St1mmar'' of: Utal-i La<v:
T,and Use zonin'l and Eminent Domain,
Section 11.13 (lg7CJ).
'C''ie anther states that "the inclusion of
a term 'practical CliFtic'lltiios' in Sections 11)-Q-l:? (3) (a) and
17-27-lf'.\(3) of the Utah Code came ahout after a oecision in
Walton wl-iicl-i ~ight nossiblv inoicate that the legislature did
recoqni:".e two standards that necessarilv shoulo be apolied to
two t"pes of variances".

-11-

Board of Adiustment v. Kwik-Check Realtv, Tnr., 1R9 A.?d l/.R9,
17-91

(Del. 1978) the Delaware C'.rJurt constn1f'd a statute simi 11r

to the Utah zoninq Law and held:
•.• that the Superior rourt correctlv rlistinquisherl
the two tvoes of varianc:f'S and nrf'sc:rihf'rl a less
hurrlensome test where an arf'a v~rianc:f' is in issuf'
undf'r Section l_lS?(a)(".).
Mani/ stat<>s, 1,iith comparable statutorv provisions, have adoptf'd such an interprf'tation. (S<>e cases citPd helow) 4 Thf' rational,
which we aoprove is that a usf' variance chanqes the
character of the zoned district bv oermittinq an
otherwise proscrihed use, (cite omitted), whereas an
area variance concerns onlv the practical difficultv
in using the Particular propertv for a permitted use.
It is onlv logical to assume a less strinqent standarrl for
an area variance:
An area variance relating to restrictions such as side
vard, rear vard, frontaqr, sethack or minimum lot
requirements, does not alter the c'iaracter of the
zoned district, whereas a us~ variance s~eks A u~~
ordinarilv prohi~ited in thf' nartic11lar district.
(Bmnhas is acHerl)

397 A. ?d 'l3G, 941 (D.C. l\nn.

lQ7~)

not necessarv for rJisnostion of i:::l1is case,

behind the standard is

4

.

su~rnitted

.

1
)111::.

t.11~

reas0ninq

for the Court's consideration.

- See Indian Village Manor Comnanv v. Detroit, Mich. Ann., I)
Mich. Apo., fi79, 147 N.W. ?rl 711 (l'll)7); w,,stMinist"r Coro. v.
Zoning R~. of Rf'view of the Citv of Providf'nre, R.I. Supr., 101
R.I. 381, 218 A. ~d 1Sl (lqf)R); PalmPr v. Boarrl of 7,onin<i
Adiustment, D.C. Apo., ?.87 A. ?.cl 51S (l972), and Mclean v.
Sole", Mel. Aym., ?.70 ~ld. App. ?.08, 1.10 A. 7d 78.1 (l971).
Sef'
also 1 Anderson, American Law of Zoninq, Sf'ction 14.~5 et Sf'q.
(1968).
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In the present case, the Smithfield Citv Board of Adjustments
found that both difficulties and hardships would be imposed upon
thP applicant if his permit was not granted.
After Walton, supra,

(R.57 at para. h).

it is clear that a Board of

Adjustments does not have the riqht to grant a use variance, but
it seems to be the contention of the Appellant that the Board of
Adjustments be rendered virtuallv imPOtent, powerless to grant
even an area variance.

The parameters of the Board of

Adjustment's authority are not so constricted.

In Freeman,

suora, at S37, the Montana Court addressed this ooint:
Apoellant contends that the board of adjustment did
not have the power to authori~e the issuance of the
permit to Clark.
In this connection it is suggested
that the varLition "lhich the borird has the power to
make refers onlv to sliqht variations, such as the
heiqht of a building, o~ the distance it must be
from the street, etc.
We find little merit in this
contention.
Ohviouslv, the Legislature could not fix
anv definite rule that would fit everv individual case
of alleged hardship.
The authoritv conferred uoon the
!Joarcl was, of necessitv, of a general nat11re and discretionarv.
Althouoh anpellants would use the dicta of the Walton Court
to confine variances to "detail and construction" in the
granting of building oermits, but it does not apnear from the
cc;sc,s or the statutes t!-iat s11ch a limited function was intended.
(Acpellant's Brief prige 8).
A.

A decision bv the Board of Adiustment should be overturned only if clearlv an abuse of discretion or illegal.

An examination of the record,

reveals that considerable

time and effort was scent by all tl-iree governmental bodies
involved in dicussing and deliberating the variance request made
-11-

by Mr. Richardson.

More than one meeting was held in which

Appellant and others appeared and voiced their opinions.
45, 47, 50, 'i3, and S4).

(R.

40,

In addition, in the discussion of the

proposed variance, as recorded in the minutes of each meeting,
the Board of Adjustments examined twelve separate areas of critical importance and found, after voting uPon each, that the
variance could pass.

(R. 'i7).

Appellant's brief repeatedly refers to "no evidence" or
"nothing in the record" to support the Trial Court's granting of
Summary ,ludqment and indeed implies that such juc:lgment was
"orematt1re".

(See Anpellant's Brief pages 5, e:;, 9 l'.2, 13 and l'i).

Nevertheless, there is no direct challenge that this case was
not a proper one for summary judgment.

The facts are not in

disoute and nowhere has Aopellants alleger'l bv affidavit or
otherwise that such a dispute exists.

If the Appellants were

aware of conflicting evidence that would lead to a disputed
material fact, then it is their burrlen to brinq forth sur::h euidence to the Trial Court.

In a rer::ent

Uta~

case,

Financial v. Ne1v Empire f"levelripm 0 nt CrimPanv, i;59

Fran~lin
P •.'M

1040,

lrJ44

(Utah lg81), it was asserted on appe;il that sul'lmarv jud0ment was
inapprooriate as the adv10rse Dilrtv's s11pportinq affir'lavits were
r'lefective.

'T'he Court said:

Bowever, it is axiomatic thilt miltters not presented
to the trial court mav not he raised for the first
time on appeal.
The Court also held at 1044:

-14-

The opnonent of the motion, once a nrima facia case
for summary judgment has heen made must file responsive
affidavits raising factual issues, or risk the Trial
Court's conclusion that there are no factual issues.
Rule S!i (e).
Apnellants mav now wish for a more comnlete record on
appeal, but the burden was theirs to contest the evidence or
bring forth missing facts by affidavit.

Thev are now critical

of the Board's findings as incomnlete or not specific enough,
yet nowhere do the statutes require such specif icitv.
Brief at 13).

(Annellants'

A similar issue was quic\.:ly aisnosed of in

Parish of St. Andrews Protestant Enisconal Church v. Zoning
Board of Appeals of the Citv of Stamford,
(Conn.

232 A.2d q1fi, 920

1%7):

To find error in the manner in which the board made
its reauired findings or that those findings did not
fully ~omnlv with the standards enumerated in the
regulations would compel this court to indulge "in
a microsconic search for technical inf irmiti~s" in
t11e boarrl' s action anrl would unscrunulo11slv interfere
with "tr1e legitimat<: acti,1ities of ciuic arlministrative
boards".
(Cite omitted)
Inasmuch as there are no resnonsive af f idauits alleging contraverted facts or thP lac\.: thereof, Apnellant's repetitious
reference

"I.

to "no evirlen~r:.:

11

it

that

t11° l1irlqi'1ent

hr,:i,s

"nrernat1Jre' 1

Standarrl of R"uiPW on .".-::meal.

When a partv atternnts to overturn a decision bv an administrative zoning authoritv,

it must first overcome a presumption

of correctness and validity which attaches to the decision by

-1.5-

such an authoritv.

Courts have qPnerallv deferred to the dPci-

sion of a Board of ArljustrnPnt as the Board makes its decision
based on personal kn01-1lerlqe nf the propertv,

the -:>:oned area cind

after full discussion at rneetinqs held bv the Board.
The standcird for an appellate review of such a decision was
carefullv stated in Whitcomb v. Citv of Woodward, 616

P.~d

455,

456 (Okl.App. 1980):
The granting or denial of a variance is within the
sound discr~tion of the municipal zoninq official
and the boards of cidiustment. (Cite omitted) Aooeals
from the decisions of the boards of adiustment are
to the District Court and the cause is tried de novo.
These Proceedings are equitable in nature.
Therefore,
the scope of review of this Court is not to substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court, hut rather
to determine whether the trial court has abused its
discretion. Unless clearlv aqainst the weight of the
evidence, the judgment of the tricil court will not be
disturbed. (Cite omitted)
In variance cases a oresumotion exists in favor of the
correctness of the determination arrived at bv the
board of adiustment. Whe~ this rletermination has been
affirmed bv. the> district r:o,1rt on cirmeal, this presumption is entitled to areat ~eight. (Cite omitted)

278.

substitute its jurlqment for that of both the Trial Court and the
Board of Adjustment.
222, 5fi1 P. 2d 1069, 1072 (l'l77) the Knnsas Court considere>d an
action by a neighborinci land owner to enioin construction of a
buildinq in an area

~oned

residential.

-lfl-

The 7,oninq Board of

Appeals ref11serJ to cancel the Defenoant' s builoing Permit, but
at trial the District Court reoucea the size of the huiloing the
Appellctnt co11lo constr11ct.

"'he Apnellate Court re1Tersed this

oecision emnhasizinq the imPortance of the role of the zoning
Boara of Anpeals.

"'he Court sctio:

The law in Kansas is clear that neither a trial court
nor an appellate court can suhstitute its juogment for
that of the Boaro of zoning Anpeals in matters other
than law or essentiallv juoici~l matters, ano neither
court can oeclare the hoaro's actions unreasonahle
unless clearlv compellea to ao so hv the e1Tidence.
(r:i tes omitted)
(

... )

From the recora it is clear the '!'rial Court exceeoed
the permissible extent of jurJicictl review and substit1Iter1 its jungment for that of the Roctro of zoning
Appeals of Lvons, Kansas. "'hat it r::oulo not ao.
'!'1-ie majriritv of Apnellant' s arqument, Points I
anrJ (C) nf Apnc:llants I l-)r ief

r

(A) (R)

is nirectea tn•'laras askinq this

Cnurt to stanr1 in the olace of tl-ie BoarrJ of Arljustment ana act
as a tvpe of "super zoning cnmrnission".

Pora Leasinq

Development Cornnanv v. Board of Cnuntv Commissioners, 528 P.2d

conclusinns marl"" 1-:Jv t'1p

1'02rr1

examine the rer::orrJ to spe

i~

of l\r1:i1ist 1n"nts" ;onn "inr1ependentlv
the snirit of the orrlinance was

violated", but the hurnen of persuasion ana evioence was upon
the Aonellants nrior to their takinq this anneal.
Brief p.9)

(Anpellants'

The nres11mption nf cnrrectness that attaches to a

rJecision bv a Rnara nf Arljustment will not generallv be interferrea with unless that hurrlen is met.

-17-

"'1-iis princinle was

discussed in Cottonwood Heiqhts Citizen's Association v. Board
of Commissioners of Salt Lilke Countv,
1979) wherein the

~ourt

593 P.

~d

Ll8, 140

(Utah

held:

Due to the comolexitv of factors involved in the matter
of zoninq, as ln other fields where courts review the
actions of administratiue bodies, it should be assumed
that those chilrqed with that responsibilitv (the
Commission) have specialized knowledge in that field.
Accordingly, they should be allowed a comparatively
wide latitude of discretion; and their actions endowed
with a oresumption of correctness and validity which
the courts should not interfere with unless it is shown
that there is no reasonable basis to justifv the action
taken.
(Emphasis Added)
Respondents submit that Appellants have failed to show there wils
no "reasonable basis to justifv the action taken" by the
Smithfield Cit" Board of Adjustment and therefore the decision
should stand.
C.

Cottonwood Heiqhts, supra.

The doctrine of self-created hardship is inapplicable
as Richardson did not creilte the hardship.

It is Appellant's contention that Richardson knew or should
have known prior to purchasinq the propertv of the one-acre
zoning restriction and therefore he should bP nrohibited from
buildinn on the lot.

~he

Trial ~ourt direcllv addressed this

argument and stated at R.81:
Richardson himself did not create the problem because
it was the nrevio11s owner that split the lots •vhich
are subject to the one-acre restriction.
Richardson
and the seconcl par tv 1voc1lr1 not f-Je alloc1ed to makP use
of the orooertv nor would an'rone else •vho subsequentlv
bouqht from them if this •vere to be riqidlv applierl,
and unless the propertv was rezoned, probably set forever unused for anv purpose.

-18-

If Utah were to adoot the doctrine as espoused bv Appellants,
the whole purpose behind the enactment of variance procedures
would be undermined.

Prooertv would be held inalterablv fixed

in its present condition without recourse for relief or change
except for an entire rezoninq.
Other courts have held that a better rule is to approach
each variance on a case-bv-case basis to determine if it meets
the standards for the grant of a variance descite crevious
restrictions.

In Board of Adiustment of Oklahoma Citv v.

Shanbonr, 43'i P.7.d sr:;g, 'i75 (Okl. lgf)8) tl-ie Court discussed what
it felt to be a better rule:
Altl-iough New York and several other states hold that
purchase of Procertv witl-i knowledge, actual or presumed,
of restrictions contained in zoning ordinances prohibit
the purchaser from seekinq any variance from such restrict ions, it is ouc opinion that the better rule and
the one followed in a number of jurisdictions is that
such purchase does not orohihit the granting of a
variance. See 2 Rathkoof, suora,[The law of ?,oning
and Planninq ()r1l Bd.) l.h. 1\8] Section 7-, an'l cases
cited therein.
In our view, were we to hold that such
a ourc\-iaseo 1.;as a self-il'loosed hrtrdsl-iin, an unr1ue
restriction woul'l be placed upon a purcl-iaser, who,
ciltl-io11gh he was a'JlR to show that the oneration of
a zoning ordinanre unon the pronectv di'l create an
unneces~a

rRlief:.
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In any event, though, the courts are fairlv well agreed
that a variance mav not he granted to the owner of a
substandard lot where the applicant rleliheratelv
created the s~hstandar~ nature of the lot.
(Emphasis adrled)
This statement of the rule oresents a more logical approach to
the question of self-creat 0 rl hardship.

Since Richardson rlirl not

create the "suhstandarrl nat ire of the lot", he and his successorc
in interest should not be bound to such a harsh restriction which
would deny the existence of anv exception, despitP the hardships
or di ff ic11l ti es imoosed.
CONCLUSION
The

q~~stion

of whether or not to grant a zoning variance

is one of particular local concern.

Local authorities are

generallv familiar with the nePrls ann act1Jal circ1Jmstances of
the comm1Jnitv ann are in the hest nosition to plan the ornerlv
growth ann expansion of the co

,,~uni

tv.

The grant of a .33 acre vari;irice bv the Boarn of Arlj11stments
in conjunction with the i·lcinniriri anrl Zoninr1 Corunission anrl Citv
Council, "lfter rlllr> c r" and rl'°liheration,
rriv"'

ic;

not o·:tsirle the scrici•'

intc:qri _v r"" t

~P

0vera.ll znninci

plan remains intact anrl the ~~irit of the ordinance has not heen
altererl.
Appellants hav0 olainlv receiverl all orocerlur;il rights to
which thev are entitlen and more.

~heir

orotests as to a

lac~

of procedural saf eguarns is ;i smo~e-screen to ohscure the fact
that thev have receiven greater orocenur;il Protection than that
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to which they normally would be entitled in the absence of the
challenged ordinance.
For the reasons and authorities cited herein, the undersigned
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the decision of the
Trial Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of November, 1983.
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B. H. Harris,
Attorneys for:
Respondent/Smithfield Citv
Co-Defendant, Robert Richardson joins in this Brief by
Smithfied City and elects not to file additional authoritv as
the issues oresented are amplv covered herein.

W. Scott Barrett
Attornev for Co-Resoondent
Rohert Richardson
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MAILING CER'l'IF'TCA'T'E
I herehv certifv that I rnailen a tr11e and correct copy of
the above ann foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDP,N'T', SMITHFIELD CI'T'Y, to
the following:
Davin R. Daines, Esq.
Christopher L. Dain~s, Esq.
DAINES & SMITH
108 North Main, Suite 203
Logan, Utah 84321
Attornevs for Plaintiffs/Acoellants
W. Scott Barrett, Esq.
BARRETT & BRl\.DY
300 South Main
Loqan, Utah R43~1
Attornev for Defenr1ant/
Responnent Robert Richarnson
on this ~ nav of Novernher, 198 3.
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Steven R. F'~ller
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